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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE. INTEREST 
OF MARALEE LOND01N. 
ROBERT GEARY LONDON and 
SANDRA CLEGG LONDON, 
Petitioners and Appellants. 
vs. 
BARBARA BELL. Guardian ad Litem 
for JEANNE BELL, 
Objector and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 10,002 
An appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court of the 
First District Court in and for Weber County, Utah 
E. F. ZEIGLER, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
AND HOLDING OF TRIAL COURT 
This is an appeal resulting from a judgment granted 
in the Juvenile Court of the First District. The judgment 
of the trial court was that the subject child be returned to 
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' . . 1~ J.-.~ ,.JI i'4 ~ ,' 
the natural mother. The Appel,lants, having been refused 
a consent by the natural ~other, sou~ht to. h~rJe the child 
declared deserted and abandoned, to complete their adop-
tion proceedings. After the Court's ruling in favor of the 
Respondent, the Appellants filed a motion to set aside 
judgment for a re-hearing. The decision of the trial judge 
'vas filed on July 30, 1963. The first notice of appeal was 
filed by Appellants on August 27, 1963. The motion to set 
Clside judgment was apparently filed on August 30, 1963. 
rrhe order denying the motion for rehearing was filed on 
September 24, 1963. The Appellants filed a second notice 
of appeal on October 11,' 1963. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent desires that the decision of the lower 
Court be affirmed and that this Court order that her minor 
child be returned to her, in accordance with the decision 
of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as stated by the Appellants are essentially 
correct. There are additional facts, however, that the Re-
spondent considers essential. The document referred to 
under Appellants' Statement of Facts was prepared by the 
Appellanrts and all statements made therein were prepared, 
and the document was executed prior to the Appellants' 
arrival in California to accept delivery of the child. (T. 9) 
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Respondent further testified that she didn't want to give 
her baby to Appellants but was coerced by her doctor and 
relations to give the baby up. Respondent further believed 
that she could recover possession of her baby in accord-
ance with the wording of the document wherein the right 
was reserved to her to refuse consent. (T. 7) Respondent 
further only signed the document only after she was told 
by the doctor, nurse and her mother, that she could not 
see the baby until the papers were signed. (T. 8) Respon-
dent further made an attempt and started to recover her 
child approximately two months after it was delivered to 
the Appellants. She also testified that within three weeks 
to a month later that she decided to seek to recover her 
child. (T. 14) No attempt was made by the Appellants to 
obtain the consent of the natural mother, Respondent, 
until approximately ten months after Appellants received 
the child. Respondent had obtained counsel in Ogden to 
bring an action to recover the child when Appellants filed 
their petition with the Juvenile Court. (T. 22) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JEANNE BELL, NATURAL MOTHER, NEVER IN-
TENDED HERSELF TO CONSENT TO THE PLACE-
MENT OF HER CHILD WITH APPELLANTS. HER 
ACTIONS WOULD NOT SHOW AN ABkNDONMENT 
OR DESERTION OF HER CHILD. 
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4 
From the testimoniY of Jeanne Bell, (T. 4), it is ap-
parent that in her own mind Jeanne Bell wanted to keep 
her child. 
Q. And did you discuss, with them your desires 
in this matter? 
A. I told them I wanted to keep my baby. 
Q. But she wouldn't allow it at the time. Is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, and especially when my doctor had told 
me I might have to go to Court. 
Q. At the time that these discussions were had, 
did you advise anyone of your intent to place the 
baby out for adoption? 
A. You mean, did I tell anyone I would have 
the baby adopted? 
Q. Yes.. 
A. The doctor thought I should place the baby 
with the Londons. 
Q. Now was this before the birth of the baby? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you advise anyone besides your doctor? 
A. We didn't talk about it at home. We were 
planning to leave it up to the doctor. 
Q. Were any provisions made for keeping the 
baby at the time of its birth? 
A. No. 
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Q. None whatsoever? 
A. My mother had made none, but I was plan-
ning on keeping it and fighting to get my baby 
back when I could and as far as I knew I had no 
legal way then of keeping it, so I planned some 
day I would try and get it back if I could. 
It is apparent from this testimony that the natural 
mother never abandoned her child or intended to sever 
her desire to regain possession of her child. In Taylor v. 
Waddoups, 241 P. 2d 160, paragraph 6, our court defined 
abandonment to be as follows: 
"Abandonment, in such cases, ordinarily means 
that the parent has placed the child on some door-
step or left it in some convenient place in the hope 
that some one will find it and take charge of it, or 
has abandoned it entirely to chance or to fate. To 
make arrangements before hand with some proper 
and competent person to have the care and custody 
of the child is not an abandonment of it as that 
term is ordinarily understood. True, the mere act 
of giving away the child by the parent into the care 
and custody of another may militate against him 
in reclaiming its custody." 
As also stated in Taylor v. Waddoups, the mere lapse 
ot the time, without more, is not decisive. As stated in 
paragraph 2 of the trial courts decision, Jeanne Bell did, 
during the ten month period, exert efforts to investigate 
her rights and attempt to contact her child and was con-
cerned about the child's welfare. It is further apparent 
from her testimony that during the ten months period she 
had done things on her own to attempt to regain posses-
sion of her child. ( T. 22): 
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A. No. I did not know I would be allowed to 
until two weeks ago. I talked to the Legal Aid So-
ciety and I found out that according to California 
law I had the right to have my child returned and 
I didn't know what I could do. Then I got in touch 
with Attorney Murray. I wanted to but I didn't 
know I could. 
Q. Didn't you say that you consulted some peo-
pleat Welfare to find out what your rights were? 
A. Yes, I found out that I should be able to 
care for the baby if I had her. 
Q. Did you con:sult an attorney in California, 
Miss Bell? 
A. I consulted Legal Aid at first. 
Another case wherein the facts are similar to the case 
at bar is In Re Guardianship of Rutherford, 10 Calif. R. 
270, wherein it was held that the mother had not surren-
dered her rights to her child where she had given it up for 
adoption only on the advice of other people and basically 
against her own convictions. People v. Anonymous, 210 
~.Y.S. 2d 698. 
From the wording of the document that was signed 
by the natural mother in the hospital, as stated in the next 
to last sentence. 
I HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED AND UNDER-
STAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS PURELY 
A STATEMENT OF MY PRESENT INTENTION 
AND THAT I HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO 
REFUSE TO SIGN MY CONSENT TO THE ADOP-
TION WHEN IT IS PRESENTED TO ME. 
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Jeanne Bell reserved her right to recover her child, and 
she relied upon said statement. It also appears from the 
testimony of Jeanne Bell that she signed the document 
because she was refused the right to see her child. (T. 8) 
Q. Isn't it true that this exhibit No. 1 contains 
a statement of your rights with respect to this. 
A. I know my rights, but I didn't know some 
things and there were things in there that I 
couldn't exactly remember that I didn't find at the 
time I signed it, things that I should have had the 
right of discussing with my family and as I say, 
some of the things I remember and then I re-read 
the paper when I got home from the hospital but I 
did read the paper there, but there were a few 
rights I feel I should have been told. 
Q. But these rights that you are talking about 
were not rights that the Londons represented to you 
in any that you did not have, did they? 
A. I think I should have had a chance to hold 
my baby and talk this over with my mother. 
Q. Do you know whether or not the Londons 
were responsible for your failure to be able to hold 
your baby and talk these things over with your 
mother? 
A. No, I think it was the doctor and nurse. The 
nurse told my mother that they had orders not to 
let me see my baby until the papers were signed. 
It is also apparent from the testimony that the docu-
ment was prepared by Appellants and therefore should be 
strictly construed against them. 
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POINT II 
THAT THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN OB-
TAINING THE CHILD IN CALIFORNIA AND BRING-
ING IT INTO UTAH WAS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
STATUTES. 
Utah Statute 55-8-3 provides as follows: 
PLACEMENT OF CHLDREN FROM WITHOUT 
STATE: 
Every child brought into or sent into the State for 
placement or adoption in the State shall be sent to 
and placed by an agency licensed under the provis-
ions of this Chapter. 
It is apparent that the reason for this statute is tore-
quire that all children brought into the State of Utah to be 
placed for adoption, must be placed with a licensed agency 
as provided by law. The legislature knew that investiga-
tion should be made concerning the home for the child, 
the ability of the prospective parents to be able to ade-
quately care for the children, and to have some control, 
supervision and regulation of the placement of children 
for adoption. It is obvious that this statute was intended 
to stop the baby traffic, and bringing of children from 
other states into the State of Utah without going through 
the licensed agencies. 
If the procedure followed in our case is legal, then the 
Utah Statute would be circumvented and there would be 
no regulation or control over children brought inrto the 
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State of Utah and the protection and benefits of the statute 
would be completely annulled. 
The Utah Legislature has seen fit to place rigid re-
strictions and regulations concern~ing the adoption of chil-
dren in the State of Utah. If this practice is legal, there 
could be a substantial increase in children brought into the 
state through no control or regulation. It would be a means 
whereby any Utah couple, that did not desire or could not 
comply with the Utah Law concerning the adoption of 
children in Utah, could go to some other State and obtain 
a child through whatever means and bring it into the State, 
and accomplish what the legislature has sought to prohibit. 
Utah Statute 55-8-5 further provides: 
Every person, agency, firm, corporation, or associa-
tion violating any of the provisions of this Chapter, 
or who intentionally makes any false statement or 
report to the State Department of Public Welfare 
with reference to the matters contained herein is 
guilty of misdemeanor. 
It is very clear that the criminal penalty imposed by 
Statute for the failure to comply with Statute 55-8-3, con-
cerning children brought into the State, that the legislature 
intended to put teeth into the law in requiring the children 
be placed with agencies when brought into this State. 
POINT III 
THAT THE NATURAL MOTHER CANNOT VOL-
UNTARILY RELINQUISH HER RIGHTS TO HER 
CHILD. UNLESS A CONSENT IS OBTAINED AS PRO-
VIDED BY UTAH STATUTE. 
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Utah Statute 78-30-4 provides as follows: 
That the parent or parents whose consent would 
otherwise be required have theretofore, in' writing, 
acknowledged before any officer authorized to take 
acknowledgment, released his or her or their con-
trol or custody of such child to any agency licensed 
to receive children for placement or adoption under 
Chapter 8 Title 55 and such agency consents, in 
writing, to such adoption. 
It is clear from the expressed statement of this Statute 
that the only means by which a consent can be taken from 
a parent is if it is given to a licensed agency. 78-30-8 fur-
ther provides: 
The person adopting a child and the child adopted, 
and the other persons whose consent is necesary, 
must appear before the district court of the county 
where the person adopting resides, and the neces-
sary consent must thereupon be si~ed and an 
agreement be executed by the person adopting to 
the effect that the child shall be adopted and treated 
in all respects as his own lawful child; provided, 
that if a person whose consent is necessary is not 
within the county the court may, in the same man-
ner as is or may be provided for the taking of de-
positions in civil cases, appoint a commissioner to 
examine such person upon his deposition and to 
take his written consent and to certify the same to 
the court. The commissioner shall explain to such 
person the legal significance of such consent, and 
shall certify to the court his finding as to whether 
or not the consent is freely given. Where such per-
son is within the state of Utah the commission shall 
issue to a judge of the district court of the county 
in which such person is located. 
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As is stated in this statute, the law requires that any 
consent given must be given before a commissioner ap-
pointed by the court. Until this is done and this consent is 
freely given then there has not been a consent that would 
permit an adoption to be granted. 
It is interesting to note that the statute -says that the 
commissioner shall certify to the court, his findings as to 
whether or not the consent is freely given. It is apparent 
that the reason for this statute is that there shall be some 
formality to the signing of consents wherein people agree 
to release their own children and that this is for the pro-
tection of the natural parent so that these will not be hur-
riedly or unwillingly given. 
There is no reason why the consent of Miss Jeanne 
Bell could not have been taken before a commissioner ap-
pointed by the court, prior to November of 1962. It would 
be a reasonable inference that the adopting parents knew 
or heard from Doctor Sloan that Miss Jeanne Bell had 
indicated that she wanted her child returned and would 
not sign the consent, and that the longer that the Londons 
could keep the child in their home the stronger their case 
\vould be in claiming permanent custody to the child. 
As stated in Taylor v. Waddou,ps, 241 P. 2d 157, Utah 
Statute 78-30-9 no longer sanctions the relinquishment of 
a child for adoption before a notary public. 
POINT IV 
THAT, JEANNE BELL, WITH THE HELP OF HER 
MOTHER CAN PROVIDE A SUITABLE HOME FOR 
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'rHE CHILD AND HAS THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF 
CARING FOR THE CHILD. 
(T. 48, 49) 
Q. Do you own your own home? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What is its approximate value? 
A. I had it appraised about five years ago and 
it was vppraised at $30,000, and since now the prop-
erty has now gone up it would be between $32,000 
and $35,000. 
Q. How many rooms are there in the home? 
A. It has eight rooms. 
Q. And how large is it? How large is the lot? 
A. We haven't had that 
Q. Is there an apartment on this property too? 
A. Yes, I have. It is built in a wing, as a lot 
of people do on their homes in that area and some 
people rent to a lady or a school teacher. 
Q. Have you rented that before? 
A. Oh, I rented it once when I was working. 
I had a lady help with the kids for part of the rent 
and baby sit with the girls. 
Q. How much did it rent for? 
A. At that time they rented for $75.00 a month. 
She rented it for $50.00 and then I took the other 
$25.00 for baby .sitting. 
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Q. What is the monthly income you have now? 
A. We have it set up by the Glendale Court as 
our allowance, family allowance. They include a 
Social Security and Veteran's pay that we get and 
then they added $100 a month. 
Q. What is your total monthly income? 
A. I bring it up to at least $400 a month. Some-
times $450. If necessary I can work all of the time, 
but I wanted to spend part of the time with the 
girls. 
Q. Do you have any money in savings now? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. How much is that? 
A. $3,800 and I have my bank book here with 
me. I can give you the bank account. 
Q. This is $3,839.00 that is in your account. Is 
that true? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. And according to this Jeanne has in her ac-
count $1180.00 and Denise has $1221.00? 
A. That is right. 
Q. I noticed on the books that in the last year 
these accounts have increased from about $2,500 to 
$4,000. Have you been able to save this much 
money in the last year? 
A. Yes, I worked and some of that was stocks. 
The sum of $2,500 were paid from them. 
Q. Do you have any of that stock now? 
.A .. ~o, they have been paid now. 
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. Q. Do you have any other assets besides your 
saVIngs accounts and your home? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you feel that you have sufficient funds 
to provide for the necessities of this child? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Would you be willing to assume this obli-
gation? 
A. Yes, I would. Definitely. 
POINT V 
THAT IT IS BETTER FOR THE WELFARE OF 
THE CHILD THAT IT BE RAISED BY ITS NATURAL 
PARENT. 
The common law and our decisions have consistently 
held that there is a strong presumption that it is in the best 
interest of a child that it be left in the home of the natural 
parent. In Re Bradley, 167 P. 2d 978. It is apparent from 
the record that an investigation of the home of the natural 
parent was made by the California Youth Authority and 
that the report was favorable. There is nothing in the 
record that would indicate that the natural mother is not 
of good moral character and in fact from her testimony 
it appears that she was of above average intelligence and 
maturity. The court, upon its own motion and with the 
consent of the parties, had the natural mother evaluated 
by a psychologist. Testimony given by the psychologist 
on page 102 indicates that she does have sufficient mental 
capabilities. (T. 102) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
Q. Have you had occasion to talk with her? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Was this pursuant to a request by the at-
torneys involved or by the Court? 
A. By the Court. 
Q. Was this in the form of an examination? 
A. Yes sir, it was. 
Q. Will you explain the nature of the tests that 
were given? 
A. The request was that I give a battery of 
tests for a phychological examination. Do you want 
me to tell what tests were used? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
DR. SWANNER: We used the Wechsler-
Bellevur (Form II), Bender-Gestalt, Memory 
for Design, Drawing, Rorschach, TAT, M.M. 
P.I. 
A. Would you explain the procedure you used? 
(Procedures were not clear on tapes) 
Q. Now, is this the standard approach in de-
termining the level of security of the person? 
CLERK: Dr. Swanner, please speak a little 
louder. 
(Dr. Swanner explained the purpose of each 
test but did not speak loud enough for mechan-
ical device to pick up.) 
Q. W auld you like to go ahead and tell the 
Court your opinion? 
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A. Well, my impression at this point is that 
she is as mature as a fifteen year old could be. 
Q. Based on your tests, could you give an opin-
ion that would indicate whether or not she could 
adequately raise a child of a little over a year old? 
A. In my opinion, there was nothing to indicate 
that she couldn't. 
Q. And what do you base your opinion on? 
A. She has above average intelligence, attends 
scho?l. She seemed to have made reasonable plans 
and Is able to relate. My impression of her is she 
is quite mature. 
POINT VI 
THAT THE FINDIN·GS OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT, SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THEY 
ARE CL.EARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
It is apparent that the Juvenile Court took consider-
able time and gave this matter great consideration before 
the decision was rendered. The Court itself prepared the 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Decree. Tes-
timony and depositions were introduced from all available 
'vitnesses and sources of information. The Court on its 
own directed that an investigation of the home of the nat-
ural mother be made in California. The Court also, with 
the consent of the party, ordered that the natural mother 
be given the psychological and mental evaluation to de-
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termine her abilities to assume the responsibilities of 
n1otherhood. The Court also stated on page 3 of the Mem-
Clrandum Decision, as follows: 
Another consideration1 in determining custody is 
the home in which the child will be living if re-
turned to her mother. The child would live with its 
mother in its grandmother's home in California. 
An evaluation of that home made for the Court by 
the California Youth Authority is favorable. 
Finally, the Court would like to note its own ob-
servations of the mother taken from her conduct 
in Court. She exhibited composure and maturity 
unusual to a girl her age and her responses to 
questions put by counsel and by the Court showed 
an insight into the responsibilities and difficulties 
of motherhood. 
In light of this evidence the Court cannot conclude 
that the presumption in favor of leaving the child 
with the natural parents has been overcome. The 
Court recognizes that it will be difficult for the 
child to be acclimated to a new setting and en-
vironment. But it is also the Court's observation, as 
well as that of many professional writers, that in 
most instances adoptive homes present many prob-
lems to the children involved. The Court therefore 
finds that it would be in the best interest of Maralee 
London that she be returned to the custody of her 
natural mother, under the courtesy supervision of 
the California Youth Authorities. 
Our Court has stated in the case of State in the Inter-
est of K-B-, cited in 326 P. 2nd, 395, as follows: 
Hearings in the Juvenile Court as to the custody 
of children are equitable, and the Supreme Court 
is responsible for reviewing the evidence; and the 
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findings made will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly against the weight of evidence or the Court 
has abused its discretion. 
On page 3 of Appellants' brief, they mention that the 
order of the Juvenile Court was that the natural child 
should remain with Appellants pending the decision of the 
Supreme Court. It is only reasonable and logical that this 
arrangement should be ordered. 
The child has been in the Appellants' home since 
February, 1962 and a few more months would not alter 
the situation to any degree. If the child had been removed 
from the State of Utah our Court would lose jurisdiction 
until the case was finally decided. As stated by the Courts, 
there will be adjustments for all parties concerned. In the 
opinion of the psychologists, Trial Judge and the California 
investigation, it was believed that considering all factors 
concerned that the child should be returned to its natural 
mother. 
POINT VII 
THAT THE LETTER REFERRED TO ON PAGE 
12 OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF, SIGNED BY JEANNE 
BELL, WAS NEVER MAILED AND DID NOT EXPRESS 
HER TRUE DESIRES. 
Through a misunderstanding with her mother, Jeanne 
Bell thought that her mother did not want to further as-
sist her in attempting to regain her child. The letter was 
never mailed and was taken against the will of Jeanne 
Bell and delivered to Appellants. (T. 106-107) 
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Q. Miss Bell, I will show you what has been 
marked exhibit No.7 and ask if you can identify it, 
please. 
A. Yes, that's a letter I wrote to Mr. Murray. 
Q. Now, was that letter written after the first 
hearing in this court room? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And was it written after the examination by 
Dr. Swanner? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. You did, in fact, deliver it to Mr. Drennan to 
be mailed? 
A. Not to be mailed. Well, Tom was on his 
way over and my mother was just leaving and he 
knew I had had some trouble and had written it. 
Q. Can you tell me how be obtained possession 
of the letter? 
A. Well, first of all it was one night after we 
got back from Court here. I talked to him on the 
phone one night and I was having it with my moth-
er. I told him I had written the letter and he said 
he would come over. My mother was just leaving 
and because I had a misunderstanding with my 
mother. I wrote the letter and then Tom said he 
would come over to see me. Tom was on his way 
over and she was just leaving when' he got there. 
He said "give me the letter and I will mail it." He 
took the letter and then he had to move his car so 
she could get out. She was very upset with me and 
she told Tom to leave and not come back until she 
was home. And then he ran. My mother censures 
our letters and I was going to leave it in a place 
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where she could read it. I didn't seal it. We had 
argued over our financial situation. I \Vrote this 
letter to see if she would understand my feelings. 
I really had no intention of mailing it. I think I 
wrote more as a threat. Just trying to show her that 
I would change my mind. I wrote the letter more 
for her. Then after I wrote it thinking she would 
realize how I felt. I wrote the letter. We were talk-
ing before she left and he said, "where is your let-
ter and I will mail it," so my mother didn't read it. 
When he came back, I asked him for the letter and 
he said it was in the car and I thought he mailed it. 
And I asked him where the letter was. He said that 
it was right here in his pocket. I said, "give it back 
to me" and he said, "I'm going to mail it tomorrow 
morning" and I called Attorney Murray then and 
asked him to disregard it. 
POINT VIII 
THAT APPELLANTS KNEW THAT THE NATUR-
AL MOTHER COULD REFUSE TO CONSENT TO THE 
ADOPTION, UNTIL A LEGAL CONSENT WAS OB-
'fAINED. (T. 98) 
Q. And you knew that as you told it, Jeanne 
could give you trouble until this was done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By trouble you knew that she might have 
the right not to have to give her consent? 
A. I knew she had to sign a paper. 
Q. You knew she had the right not to give it 
if she didn't want to? 
A. Yes. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
Q. And you knew that when the papers were 
signed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So when you took the baby in your pos-
session, you knew that she had legal right not to 
consent to the adoption? 
A. No. I knew that she had the legal right not 
to sign the paper. 
POINT IX 
~ 
FROM THE TESTIMO·NY AND CONDUCT EXHIB-
ITED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER IN OPEN COURT 
IT WAS APPARENT THAT SHE WAS ABOVE AVER-
AGE INTELLIGENCE AND MATURITY FOR HER 
AGE. (T. 31) 
Q. Speaking of yourself, are you actually trying 
to satisfy your own feelings, your own needs or 
what you really feel is best for the child? 
A. I think I am doing what is best for the child. 
I am very concerned about what happens. to her 
later on in life, her health and I want to be with 
her, helping her. 
Q. In your discussion, I get the distinct im-
pression that you think of the child as a baby? 
A. I think of her as a child. 
Q. You keep talking about her as a very young 
child. Have you thought about her in terms of a 
6 year old, a 7 year old, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 year 
old? 
A. I've thought her as going to school. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
Q. Have you thought of her in those terms, or 
are you thinking of something you can fondle 
something you can hold. ' 
A. Well, I feel that I might help her. I feel that 
I can help her and guide her and see that she gets 
religious training while she is growing. I would 
be able to comfort her and I could help her and 
guide her. 
Q. What if she isn't interested in religion. 
A. Well, I think that with the proper training, 
she will do what is best and with guidance and help 
she will learn what is right and wrong and have a 
conscious to do right. 
Q. You don't anticipate your daughter then 
being injured or hurt by the fact that you and her 
father were not married? 
A. I thought about that and that was one rea-
son for my going to church. 
Q. Will it help your daughter? 
A. Yes, it will. She will learn about the Bible 
and God and to be good. 
Q. The inquiry of the court as conducted has 
been1 quite broad, however, I think that under the 
allegations that the mother is not a proper person 
that inquiry would be within the confines of our 
discretion. 
POINT X 
THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE A MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND THEIR NOTICE OF 
APPEAL WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW. 
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Rule 59 of the U.R.C.P. provides that a motion for a 
new trial must be made within ten days after the entry of 
the judgment. The motion for the re-hearing or new trial 
was not filed until August 30, 1963. The judgment was en-
tered on July 24, 1963. The first notice of appeal was filed 
on .August 27, 1963. A second notice of appeal was also 
filed on October 10, 1963. It would appear that the Appel-
bnts have not perfected their appeal as provided by law . 
. -lnderson v. Anderson 282 P. 2nd 845 In Re Lynch's Es-
tate 254 P. 2nd 454. Further, the designation of record on 
appeal. and cost bond, were not received by Respondent 
until December 6, 1963, several days beyond the ten day 
provision of Rule 74, U.R.C.P. Holton v. Holton, 243 P. 2nd 
438. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate for all concerned that these situations 
develop. If the Utah laws and statutes had been complied 
\Vith this situation would probably never have come about. 
If the formalities of obtaining a proper consent, as pro-
vided by Utah statutes, were initially followed, the Appel-
lants would have known if they could effect a valid adop-
tion. Also if the formalities regarding obtaining the consent 
of the natural mother were followed, then in all probabil-
ity the consent would not have been given and the mother 
could have recovered the child shortly after its birth. If 
the natural mother would have given her consent, as pro-
vided for by Utah statute, then she could not later on 
revoke this consent. 
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It is apparent from the evidence that the parties in-
tended this to be a temporary arrangement and that an 
adoption could not be effected until the natural mother 
had given a valid consent. This is why the Appellants 
initially had a commissioner in California. They did not 
claim that the child was neglected, delinquent or depen-
dent until after they learned that the natural mother would 
not give her valid consent. It was then that this action 
was filed in the Juvenile Court to circumvent the proceed-
ings for obtaining the consent. To permit children to be 
brought into our state, by this method, will foster and 
encourage baby traffic, without control. There will be no 
protection1 for the child and no investigation of the home 
or circumstances of the adopted parents as our legislature 
considered essential. 
It is respectfully requested that the decision of the 
Trial Judge be affirmed and that the custody of the natural 
child be returned to her natural mother, as provided in 
the Decree rendered herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. MURRAY 
Attorney for Respondent 
No. 10 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 
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